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The Vicissitudes of the Politics of “Life:” Max Horkheimer and 
Herbert Marcuse’s Reception of Phenomenology and Vitalism in Weimar Germany 
 
  In the 1920s and early 1930s both Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse 
engaged critically with phenomenology and vitalism.  But their reception of these two 
broad and heterogeneous philosophies differed in important respects.  Examining these 
differences will help us understand not only Horkheimer and Marcuse’s intellectual 
development and the origins of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School; it will also 
illuminate the important role that phenomenology and vitalism played in setting the terms 
of intellectual and cultural debate in Weimar Germany.  Phenomenology and vitalism 
contributed significantly to a widespread revolt against science, positivism and rationality 
more generally, which began at the end of the nineteenth century and reached its peak in 
Weimar Germany.  In what follows I will reconstruct Horkheimer and Marcuse’s 
reception of phenomenology and vitalism in order to illustrate how the two of them 
interpreted and participated in this broad critique of rationality.  I would like to 
demonstrate, in particular, that Horkheimer became aware before Marcuse of the 
limitations and dangers of the increasingly popular and popularized versions of 
phenomenology and vitalism in Weimar.  Despite his deep appreciation of  
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phenomenology and vitalism, Horkheimer had already begun in the late 1920s to argue 
that these philosophical critiques of positivism were devolving into a rejection of reason 
as such, which played directly into the hands of increasingly powerful conservative 
political currents in Weimar.  Marcuse, for his part, remained more enthusiastic about the 
phenomenological and vitalist critique of rationality until 1933.  Between 1928 and 1933 
Marcuse was a student of Martin Heidegger’s at the University of Freiburg.  During this 
time Marcuse developed an idiosyncratic version of Hegelian-Marxism, which 
incorporated key elements of Heidegger’s phenomenology.  It was only after Heidegger’s 
surprising embrace of National Socialism in 1933 that Marcuse reassessed his 
relationship to phenomenology and vitalism. 
  
 In my reconstruction of Horkheimer’s reception of phenomenology and vitalism I 
will draw primarily on a series of lectures he gave in the late 1920s.1  The title of these 
lectures, “The Emancipation of Philosophy from Science,” suggests the overall trajectory 
of Horkheimer’s intellectual historical narrative.  The historical point of departure for 
Horkheimer’s lectures was the 1850s.  This was a time when, as Marx put it, the 
decomposition of the Hegelian absolute spirit was largely complete – the widespread 
influence of Hegel’s philosophy in Europe had given way to a new realism and a general 
disdain for “German metaphysics.”  The rapid advance of the natural and physical 
sciences in nineteenth-century Europe seemed to confirm August Comte’s prediction that 
the theological and metaphysical stages of human evolution would soon give way to a 
new “positive” epoch in which science would not only guarantee unlimited progress, but 
                                                 
1  These lectures have been published in: Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 10, ed. Alfred 
Schmidt (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1990), pp. 169-419. 
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would also become the sole arbiter of truth.  Horkheimer demonstrates that philosophy 
was able to salvage a small and a rather insignificant place for itself within the changed 
intellectual division of labor of the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s only by subordinating itself 
to science and dedicating itself to working out the epistemological foundations of 
scientific method.  Horkheimer explains the rise of neo-Kantianism in German academic 
philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century precisely in these terms.  The 
pioneers and leading figures of Neo-Kantianism, such as Hermann Cohen, returned to 
Kant in order to secure the epistemological foundations of the natural sciences, not to 
revitalize Kant’s concerns with ethics, aesthetics or metaphysics.  
 Horkheimer viewed the neo-Kantians as taking the first tentative step toward 
reestablishing the legitimacy of philosophy in a positivist epoch.  But the first truly 
substantial attempt to break the monopoly of positivism and to reestablish philosophy as an 
autonomous discipline came with the publication of Edmund Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations in the year 1900.2  In that work Husserl argued that all forms of positivism, 
including psychology and other natural and social sciences, were relativistic insofar as their 
findings were always ultimately based on empirical evidence.  Philosophy, on the other 
hand, could make justified claims to absolute truth insofar as it is based on the immutable 
foundation of pure logic.  But Horkheimer believed that Husserl’s attempt to reestablish the 
logical foundations of philosophy was beset with many problems.  Whereas the positivists 
had relied too exclusively on sense impressions, Husserl was too quick to sever philosophy 
from empirical considerations.  Horkheimer’s critique of Husserl marks an important turning 
point in his narrative of the history of recent philosophy.  Whereas academic philosophy had 
                                                 
2 For Horkheimer’s discussion of Husserl, see the lectures cited in the footnote above, pp. 299-316 and pp. 
377-98. 
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been thoroughly subordinated to science in the late nineteenth century, Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations marks the beginning of movement in the opposite direction, a movement to 
separate philosophy from science  and, ultimately, to subordinate science to philosophy.  In 
Husserl’s case, however, Horkheimer stresses his intellectual probity and his insistence upon 
conceptual rigor.  Although Husserl had mounted an important critique of positivism and the 
limitations of scientific rationality, he had by no means abandoned conceptual knowledge as 
such; on the contrary, he believed that his Logical Investigations attained a more rigorous 
form of philosophical knowledge, based on the immutable foundations of pure logic.  
 Horkheimer portrays vitalism, or Lebensphilosophie, as it was called in Germany, as 
the next historical step in the emancipation of philosophy from science.  Definitions of 
philosophical vitalism differ, but Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey and Henri Bergson 
are usually considered its main representatives. Although Horkheimer does address both 
Nietzsche and Dilthey elsewhere in his work, in these lectures he focuses primarily on 
Bergson, because he best exemplified the shifting relationship between science and 
philosophy that interested Horkheimer.3  As we have seen, Husserl subordinated science to 
philosophy, but he still considered philosophy to be a logically rigorous and strictly 
theoretical undertaking. Bergson, in contrast, rejected conceptual knowledge as inadequate 
for the purpose of understanding reality.  For Bergson, all forms of conceptual knowledge, 
including science, do not reveal to us the way things are “in themselves” but are instead 
useful devices for manipulating reality, particularly “lesser” forms of reality, such as nature 
or inert matter.  Bergson argues that reality in its highest and most authentic form is the 
unceasingly active, inexhaustible creative will of life, and the further one distances oneself 
from this élan vital, the less authentic one’s findings become as a form of knowledge.  If one 
                                                 
3 Ibid., pp. 269-87, 399-419.  
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hopes to access life directly, one must rely on intuition not rational concepts.  Horkheimer 
summarizes the significance of Bergson’s position within the larger trajectory of recent 
philosophy in the following way:  
Scientific knowledge, understood in the traditional theoretical sense, was given a philosophical 
foundation by neo-Kantianism, demoted to the position of a subordinate and particular type of 
knowledge by phenomenology, and completely rejected as a means of finding truth in the vitalistic 
philosophy of Bergson.4
Despite his grave criticisms of the irrationalist tendencies in Bergson’s philosophy, 
Horkheimer also praises him for making important contributions in certain areas.  For 
example, he viewed Bergson’s rejection of the application of the mechanical methods of the 
natural sciences to the human psyche as an important step beyond the scientific psychology 
of the nineteenth century.  Bergson’s critique of science also pointed to the necessity of not 
separating conceptual knowledge from the social and historical contexts in which it is 
produced.  
Among his contemporaries in Weimar Germany, Horkheimer considered Max 
Scheler to be the philosopher who developed the impulses of phenomenology and vitalism 
in the most fruitful and rigorous manner.5 Horkheimer points, for example, to Scheler’s 
appropriation of Husserl’s concept of the intuition of essences [Wesensschau].  Whereas for 
Husserl, Wesenschau could provide access to essences only insofar as they existed logically, 
Scheler claimed it could unlock the metaphysical essences of objects and provide the key to 
their being as such.  Scheler believed, at this time, that Wesenschau might even help liberate 
Europe from the iron cage of rationalization into which it had haplessly maneuvered itself.  
In 1919, Scheler described the reenchantment of the world, which could be brought about by 
phenomenology, in the following glowing terms:  
                                                 
4 Ibid., pp. 400-1.  
5 Ibid., pp. 323-33, 392-99. 
 5
It will be like the first step into a garden in full bloom of someone who has been living in a dark 
prison for many years.  And this prison will be our milieu, which has been restricted by an 
understanding directed merely toward the mechanical and mechanizable [Mechanisierbare], with its 
“civilization.”  And this garden will be the colorful world of God, which we will see – if only in the 
distance – opening itself up and greeting us warmly.  And this prisoner will be the European man of 
today and yesterday, who enters sighing and groaning under the burden of his own mechanisms and 
who, with nothing but the earth in view and with heaviness in his limbs, has forgotten his God and his 
world.6    
Scheler’s evocative and provocative statements here clearly demonstrate how the abstract 
and philosophically rigorous doctrines of phenomenology, as formulated in Husserl’s pre-
war writings, were being placed in the service of a much broader critique of civilization in 
the Weimar period.   
 But, as was the case with Husserl and Bergson, Horkheimer still took Scheler 
seriously as a philosopher.  He recognized the important moment of truth in Scheler’s 
argument, while at the same time taking issue with his one-sided critique of science and 
rationality.  Horkheimer was ultimately more concerned about the popularizations of 
phenomenology and vitalism than with the philosophical doctrines themselves.  One 
important example that Horkheimer gives of such a popularization was Oswald Spengler’s 
Decline of the West, which enjoyed wide popularity in Germany in the 1920s, especially 
among culturally conservative circles. Horkheimer dismisses Spengler’s study as an eclectic 
and superficial synthesis of poorly understood material from a wide variety of fields.  He is 
particularly vehement in his rejection of Spengler’s facile comparison of the development of 
human culture with the life cycle of plants.  For Horkheimer, there is no comparison 
between genuine Lebensphilosophie and popularizers like Spengler.  He states,  
Whereas Bergson [was] very much aware of the internal difficulties associated with 
Lebensphilosophie in all its forms, insofar as it calls the absolute validity of thought and science into 
question, without, however, diminishing the emphatic claim to truth for its own arguments […] 
Spengler blithely and pathetically presents his sweeping views about the relativity and transience of 
all types of science, indeed, of culture in general, while at the same time drawing on every page upon 
claims that he has appropriated […] from this same science.7
                                                 
6 Quoted by Horkheimer, ibid., p. 324.  
7 Ibid., pp. 295-6.  
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Horkheimer sees this increasingly popular and superficial rejection of science, as 
represented in Spengler’s work, as part of a larger tendency, which was anticipated and 
influenced by phenomenology and vitalism.  Horkheimer argued that the attempt to 
rehabilitate metaphysics, which spread quickly from Scheler and other students of Husserl to 
the influential phenomenological movement as a whole, and the rejection of conceptual 
knowledge in favor of intuition, which characterized the popularized versions of both 
phenomenology and Lebensphilosophie, were part of a much larger cultural current in 
Europe during the first decades of twentieth century.  Horkheimer characterizes this current 
in the following way: 
At this point phenomenology merges with the widespread contemporary trend toward a new 
romanticism which has as its motto, to genuine reality, to the concrete and primordial, away from 
decadent, Western European, intellectualized man, and which is fascinated with primitive cultures, 
foreign cultures in general, classical antiquity and the Middle Ages.8
Not surprisingly, another defining characteristic of this intellectual and cultural movement 
was its rejection of the Enlightenment.9  In fact, many of its adherents viewed the 
Enlightenment, which had mounted the first concerted attack on metaphysics and rejected 
appeals to legitimacy based on authority or intuition, as the source of their problem.  
Horkheimer was deeply concerned about this widespread sentiment and he took it very 
seriously.  In lectures he had given in previous semesters on the history of modern 
philosophy, Horkheimer devoted an inordinate amount of time to the Enlightenment.10  He 
stressed, in particular, the need to recover the materialist and radical political impulses of the 
French Enlightenment.  This was truly an exceptional argument at this time, for the 
invidious comparison of French “civilization” to German Kultur, popularized by Spengler, 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 331.  
9 Horkheimer notes, for example, “in the last decades in Germany one has become accustomed to seeing 
the two words , Enlightenment and superficiality, as belonging together, even as meaning the same thing.” 
GS 11, p. 205.  
10 See his “Vorlesung über die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,” in Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 9, ed. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1987), pp. 294-401.  
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still played an important role among Weimar intellectuals, especially those on the political 
right.  But the critique of “shallow French civilization” was part of a popularized, nationalist 
version of a much deeper critique of rationality, which was by no means limited to 
conservative thinkers.  The radical critique of scientific rationality initiated by Husserl and 
the vitalists also had a substantial influence on left-wing intellectuals in Weimar Germany.11   
 As noted, Horkheimer, too, recognized an important moment of truth in these 
criticisms.  His interpretation of the history of contemporary philosophy was structured 
largely as a dialectic of Enlightenment which played itself out in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  The dialectic began with the collapse of the original, politically and 
ethically driven Enlightenment project into a monolithic scientific worldview whose 
limitations soon became apparent.  The crisis of liberalism in the late 19th and early 20th 
century was at the same time a crisis of an increasingly narrow concept of scientific 
rationality, which no longer seemed like it could realize the Enlightenment promises of a 
society that would guarantee more justice and happiness for all. Put another way, one of the 
paradoxical consequences of the Enlightenment quest to perceive reality free from the 
distortions of metaphysics and myth, and to bring nature under man’s control, was to 
undermine the very political and ethical ideals in the name of which this scientific process 
had been initiated in the first place.  In his lectures, Horkheimer describes this process in the 
following way: 
If no other realities existed beyond the world of physics and psychology, then the ideals which had 
guided the early development of this society and which justified the efforts of its individual members 
– be it human dignity, morality, freedom or something similar – were at best imagined or even 
fictitious […] At no other time did the consciousness of the meaninglessness of the natural reality 
threaten to become so strong as in the present, in which this natural reality alone is considered valid.12   
                                                 
11 See, for example, Intellekteullendiskurse in der Weimarer Republik: Zur Politischen Kultur einer 
Gemengelage, ed. Gérard Raulet (Frankfurt: Campus, 1994).  
12 GS 10, pp. 319-20.  
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The next step in this dialectic of Enlightenment, according to Horkheimer, was a 
pronounced reaction against the rational disenchantment of the world.  The emergence and 
popularization of phenomenology and vitalism represented a sweeping return of all that 
positivism had repressed.  The increasingly irrational forms in which this reaction 
manifested itself deeply troubled Horkheimer as did its tendency to reject the legacy of the 
Enlightenment tout court.  For Horkheimer was convinced that the only way beyond the 
contemporary crisis was a discriminating reappropriation of the Enlightenment legacy.  For 
example, Horkheimer too was convinced that the traditional model of science was in crisis, 
but he was not prepared to abandon science altogether. As he put it: 
In response to the question of where, in my opinion, those elements are to be found that point beyond 
the present situation, I would say first, wherever intellectual inquiry is pursued in an upright and 
rigorous manner.  […] In contrast to most all of the previously mentioned philosophers, I still believe 
that scientific understanding and its labors will contribute more to moving beyond the current 
intellectual situation than those schools of thought that believe we should do without it.13
It was largely in response to this crisis that Horkheimer developed his critical theory of 
society in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Horkheimer’s critical theory was put into practice 
and developed further when he became director of the Institute for Social Research in 1931.  
One of the main arguments I make in my forthcoming book on Horkheimer,14 but which I 
don’t have time to spell out here, is that Horkheimer’s intellectual trajectory in Weimar 
differed in important respects from most of the leading figures associated with the Institute 
for Social Research and/or Western Marxism, such as Marcuse, Adorno, Benjamin, Bloch 
and Lukacs.  Horkheimer was less influenced by the sweeping rejection of positivism, or at 
least became aware of its shortcomings before the others did, and as a result was more open 
to the continuing critical potential not only of the Enlightenment, but also the social 
                                                 
13 Ibid., pp. 332-3.  
14 John Abromeit, “The Dialectic of Bourgeois Society: An Intellectual Biography of the Young Max 
Horkheimer, 1895-1937,” dissertation submitted in the History Department at the University of California, 
Berkeley, 2004.  
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sciences. Without this openness, the crucial integration of empirical social research and 
psychoanalysis into this Critical Theory in the early 1930s would never have occurred. 
  
 Whereas the general outlines of Horkheimer’s reception of vitalism and 
phenomenology emerge clearly from lectures he gave in the late 1920, in order to justice 
to Marcuse’s reception it is necessary to focus on two different phases in his intellectual 
development.  The first phase, in the early 1920s, was defined by a lengthy dissertation 
he wrote at the University of Freiburg in 1922 on the subject of the German artist-novel, 
or Künstlerroman.15  Marcuse’s interpretation of the Künstlerroman was heavily 
influenced by the vitalist historicism of Wilhelm Dilthey and the romantic anti-capitalism 
of the early Georg Lukacs.  During the second phase, which lasted from 1928-33, 
Marcuse was also in Freiburg, but this time in order to study philosophy with Martin 
Heidegger.  During this time Marcuse wrote a series of substantial essays and a second 
dissertation on Hegel, in which he developed an idiosyncratic version of Hegelian 
Marxism, which demonstrated not only the continuing influence of Dilthey’s vitalism, 
but also, and more importantly, an effort to appropriate certain aspects of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology.  In contrast to Horkheimer, who had already clearly recognized in the 
1920s that the phenomenological and vitalist critique of science and rationalism could 
also be appropriated for right-wing political projects, Marcuse did not articulate a serious 
critique of these tendencies until after 1933, when he joined Horkheimer at the Institute 
for Social Research.  It was not just Heidegger’s enthusiastic embrace of National 
Socialism in 1933 that made Marcuse aware of the dangers of his appropriation of 
                                                 
15 Herbert Marcuse, “Der Deutsche Künstlerroman,” Schriften, vol. 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978), pp. 7-
343. 
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vitalism and phenomenology.  Marcuse had also written an article in 1931 praising Hans 
Freyer’s attempt to provide a phenomenological foundation for sociology.16  Like 
Heidegger, Freyer would soon become an outspoken defender of the National Socialist 
“revolution from the right.”  In his 1934 essay, “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the 
Totalitarian View of the State,”17 Marcuse articulated a powerful critique of the vitalist 
and phenomenological currents which had prepared the way intellectually for the Nazi 
seizure of power.  Central to Marcuse’s critique and self-critique was a reevaluation of 
philosophical rationalism, which remained a strong tendency in his thought throughout 
the 1930s and which culminated in his 1940 study of Hegel, Reason and Revolution.18
 
 The importance for Marcuse of the vitalist revolt against positivism and 
rationalism was clearly apparent in his 1922 dissertation on the German Artist-Novel.   
Methodologically, Marcuse’s study was part of the revival of human sciences or 
Geisteswissenschaften in Germany, which had been decisively influenced by Wilhelm 
Dilthey.  Although Horkheimer did not include Dilthey in his lectures on the 
“emancipation of philosophy from science,” he very easily could have.  Dilthey’s efforts 
to articulate the methodological foundations of the Geisteswissenschaften and to separate 
them clearly from the Naturwissenschaften, represented a crucial step in overcoming the 
dominance of positivism in Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century.  Dilthey’s 
1905 study, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, in particular, had a huge impact on the study 
of literature in Germany.  Dilthey placed the concept of experience and the intuitive 
                                                 
16 “Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Hans Freyers ‘Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft,’” Herbert 
Marcuse, Schriften, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 488-508.  
17 Herbert Marcuse, “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State,” Negations, 
trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1968), pp. 3-42.  
18 For Marcuse’s essays from the 1930s, see the volume cited above, Negations.   
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interpretation of the subjective expression of meaning in different historical epochs at the 
center of the human sciences.  He demonstrated that the natural sciences were incapable 
of answering the most important questions about human existence.  These questions were 
historical and cultural and could only be answered by the studying the meanings 
embedded in the cultural production of past epochs.  Following Vico’s verum-factum 
principle, Dilthey argued that we could understand history much better than we could 
nature, since we had created history ourselves and we were essentially historical beings.  
 In his interpretation of the German Artist-Novel, Marcuse followed Dilthey’s 
approach in important respects. By immersing himself in this sub-genre of the 
Bildungsroman, in which artists were the main protagonists, Marcuse believed he could 
uncover the essence of the society and the historical epoch in which they were written. 
But Marcuse departed from Dilthey in one crucial respect.  Whereas Dilthey had 
followed his mentors in the German historical school, such as Leopod von Ranke, who 
believed that all epochs “were equally close to God,” Marcuse argued that the modern, 
bourgeois society was characterized precisely by a widespread loss of meaning and 
community, which made it qualitatively different from classical antiquity and the Middle 
Ages.  Marcuse’s argument here was clearly indebted Georg Lukacs’ Theory of the 
Novel, which was published in 1916 and was also heavily influenced by Dilthey.  In The 
Theory of the Novel,19 Lukacs too argued that the essential characteristic of modern 
bourgeois society was that meaning no longer inhered in the totality of life. Lukacs’ 
argument rested upon a comparison of the dominant aesthetic forms in ancient Greece 
and modern Europe.  Whereas the Homeric epic expressed the integrated civilization of 
ancient Greece, in which art and life were still one and meaning inhered in society, the 
                                                 
19 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Boston: MIT Press, 1971). 
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form of the novel expressed the diremption of art and life and the loss of meaning in 
modern bourgeois civilization.  In modernity, according to Lukacs,  
the old parallelism of the transcendental structure of the form-giving subject and the world of 
created forms has been destroyed and the ultimate basis of artistic creation has become homeless. 
German romanticism posited a close connection between the concept of the novel and the concept 
of the Romantic, and rightly so because the novel form is, like no other, an expression of this 
transcendental homelessness.20   
Marcuse’s study of the German Artist-Novel could be seen as an extended rumination on 
Lukacs’ poignant lament on the separation of art and life and the loss of meaning and 
community in modern bourgeois society.   
 In his study Marcuse distinguishes between two types of artist-novels: a 
subjective romantic version, which expresses the genre in its purest form, and an 
objective-realist version, which tends more toward a traditional Bildungsroman..  
Examples of the latter included Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and the second edition of 
Gottfried Keller’s Der Grüne Heinrich. In both of these novels the protagonist overcomes 
his alienation and his inability to reconcile his consuming interest in art and the demands 
of everyday life.  But, Marcuse argues, this integration into bourgeois society comes at a 
high price.  The protagonist must reduce art either to an occasional educational 
experience, or to a profession which no longer reflects the fundamentally critical and 
transcendent aesthetic ideals he once held dear.  Examples of the subjective-romantic 
artist-novel include Karl-Philip Moritz’s Anton Reiser, Novalis’ Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen or the first edition of Gottfried Keller’s Der Grüne Heinrich.  In these and 
the other romantic artist-novels Marcuse discusses, the protagonist sees no possibility of 
a reconciling himself with bourgeois society; he remains alienated and usually suffers a 
tragic fate.  In both types of artist-novels, however, Marcuse argues that the form of the 
                                                 
20 Ibid., pp. 40-1.  
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novel reflects the fact that life has become “prosaic” in modern bourgeois society, that 
the “integrated totalities” of classical antiquity, in which art and life were still unified and 
meaning inhered in the social totality, no longer existed.  As Marcuse states in the 
introduction to his study:  “Der Künstlerroman ist erst möglich, wenn die Einheit von 
Kunst und Leben zerrissen ist, der Künstler nicht mehr in den Lebensformen der Umwelt 
aufgeht und zum Eigenbewusstsein erwacht.”21 This yearning for meaning and 
community, which is projected onto classical antiquity or other pre-modern social forms 
clearly mark both Lukacs’ and Marcuse’s youthful works as romantic revolts against 
capitalist modernization.  Marcuse’s study of the German artist novel was at the same 
time a vitalist inspired critique of the instrumental rationality of bourgeois society.  As 
such it can certainly be seen as part of the broader revolt against positivism in Germany 
at this time, which Horkheimer outlined in his lectures.       
 
 Marcuse’s concern with the alienation and reification of “life” in modern 
bourgeois societies would remain an important theme in his writings between 1928 and 
1933.22  In 1928 Marcuse returned to the University of Freiburg to study with Martin 
Heidegger.  By the mid 1920s Marcuse had, like Lukacs, moved from a romantic critique 
of bourgeois society to a revolutionary Hegelian-Marxism.  Marcuse had participated in a 
revolutionary soldiers’ council in Berlin in 1918-19 and sympathized with the USPD and 
early KPD, so his transition to a critical Marxist position in the mid 1920s was not 
surprising.  More enigmatic is why a young leftist like Marcuse would be attracted to 
Heidegger, whose attempts to recover the question of the meaning of Being seemed very 
                                                 
21 “Der Deutsche Künstlerroman,” p. 12.  
22 For Marcuse’s essays from this period, see Herbert Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, eds. John Abromeit 
and Richard Wolin (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).  
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far removed from the pressing concerns of crisis-ridden Weimar Germany.  In contrast to 
many of Heidegger’s students at this time, Marcuse’s deeper commitments to Hegelian 
Marxism prevented him from ever becoming a disciple of Heidegger.  His interest in 
Heidegger’s philosophy was instrumental from the very beginning.  Marcuse believed 
that certain aspects of Heideggerian phenomenology could contribute to a revitalization 
of Marxist theory and practice.  Marcuse was critical of both the reformism of the 
German Social Democratic party and the “Dialectical Materialism” which had become 
official doctrine in the Soviet Union.  Marcuse believed the theoretical shortcomings of 
both could be traced back to the influence of positivism, which had influenced not only 
“bourgeois” philosophy, but also Marxist theory as well.  As Lucien Goldman would put 
it later, in a comparative study of Lukacs and Heidegger:  
The evolution from Marx to Bernstein, Kautsky and Plekhanov is quite homologous to that which 
caused the German university philosophy of Hegel and the Young Hegelians to pass, via 
Schopenhauer and Haym, to Neo-Kantianism and university positivism. It was in relation to this 
positivism, both university and Marxist, that the beginning of the century was to produce a rather 
profound break.23  
Goldman goes on to argue that Lukacs’ critique of reification in History and Class 
Consciousness and Heidegger’s critique of Western rationality in Being and Time 
resemble one another in crucial ways.  His demonstration that both Lukacs and Heidegger 
were reacting against positivism helps us make sense of Marcuse’s interest in Heidegger.  
There were two aspects of Heidegger’s phenomenology, in particular, which Marcuse 
believed could contribute to overcoming the positivist depredations of Marxist theory:  
first, Heidegger’s critique of the rationalist concept of subjectivity and, second, his 
ontological concept of historicity. 
                                                 
23 Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Toward a New Philosophy, trans. William Q. Boelhower 
(London: Routledge, 1977), p. 3.  
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 One of Heidegger’s main aims in Being and Time was to demonstrate how an 
abstract rationalist notion of time and subjectivity had dominated Western philosophy 
since classical antiquity.  According to Heidegger, this tendency had already become 
dominant in the philosophy of Aristotle, as could be seen by his definition of time in 
terms of abstract notions of space.24  The tradition of abstract rationalism was 
rearticulated and reinforced at the beginning of the modern period by Descartes, who 
reduced subjectivity, as ego cogito, to an external and passive observer of mechanical 
natural laws.25  According to  Heidegger, nineteenth-century positivism was simply a 
more advanced version of the dominant rationalist tendency in Western philosophy.  One 
of the most important consequences of the positivist reliance upon natural scientific 
methodology was its attempt to eliminate the role of the subject in the process of 
knowledge.  The natural sciences were supposed to produce “objective” truths through 
rational reflection and empirical experimentation.  Truth obtained in this manner could be 
reproduced by any individual anywhere willing to engage in the same process of 
reflection or to replicate the same experiments. Thus, for positivism, the implicit 
collective subject of scientific knowledge was a passive, knowing subject who exists 
outside the world and has no effect upon its operation.  It is what Heidegger would call a 
“world-less” subject.  It is fundamentally an epistemological subject insofar as its 
primary purpose is to obtain knowledge and insofar as it rests upon a fundamental 
distinction between a knowing subject and a known object.  To provide an alternative to 
this “world-less” epistemological subject Heidegger engaged in an existential analytic of 
Dasein, which he calls “Being-in-the-world.” In other words, Heidegger analyzes the 
                                                 
24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinsion (San Francisco: 
Harper, 1962), p. 472-84. 
25 Ibid., pp. 122-34.  
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ontological foundations of subjectivity and the ways in which subjectivity is always 
already embedded in particular contexts of meaning and action.   Heidegger attempted to 
demonstrate how the concrete particularity and ontological characteristics of human 
Dasein have been consistently obscured by the rationalist conception of subjectivity that 
has dominated Western philosophy and Western science.  
 Insofar as Marxist theory had been contaminated by the passive, epistemological 
conception of subjectivity implicit in positivism, Marcuse believed it could benefit from a 
critical appropriation of Heideggerian phenomenology.  Anticipating similar arguments 
by his future colleague Walter Benjamin, Marcuse rejected the quietist view that Marx 
had discovered the scientific laws which proved the inevitability of socialism.  This 
overemphasis on the “scientific” character of Marx’s theory, which dominated the 
Second International, had led to the revisionism of the Social Democrats and the 
vanguardism of the Bolsheviks, which both viewed the working class as passive objects.  
But in his 1928 article, “Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism,” 
Marcuse argued that “The truths of Marxism are not truths of knowing, but rather truths 
of happening.”26  Marcuse’s appropriation here of the Heideggerian concept of 
“happening” (Geschehen), demonstrated his conviction that contemporary Marxist theory 
could be revitalized by Heidegger’s attempts to reveal the ontological foundations of 
subjectivity, which had been concealed by the rationalist tradition of Western philosophy.  
Heidegger’s efforts in Being and Time to uncover the ontological foundations of Dasein, 
culminated in his claim that Dasein is by its very nature a historical being.  With his 
concept of historicity, Heidegger offered an alternative to the various inauthentic modes 
of Being-in-the-World, to which Dasein could fall prey.  Living authentically, in accord 
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with the ontological historicity of Dasein, was possible only by tearing oneself away from 
the bad immediacy of the present, consciously appropriating the past and realizing its 
highest potential in future-oriented activity.  It is not difficult to see why this ontological 
concept of historicity, which posited a fundamentally active concept of subjectivity, 
appealed greatly to Marcuse, who was determined to overcome positivist influences on 
Marxist theory. 
 While he was studying with Heidegger in Freiburg, Marcuse became increasingly 
interested in the philosophical origins of Marx’s critical theory.  Like Lukacs, Marcuse 
believed that the serious shortcomings of the dominant positivist interpretation of Marx 
could be countered by reexamining Marx’s theoretical debt to Hegel.  This was precisely 
the project that Marcuse attempted to carry out in the Habilitationsschrift,  Hegel’s 
Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, which was published in 1932.27  As the title of 
the study suggests, Marcuse was still very much interested in Heideggerian 
phenomenology and in the concept of historicity, in particular.  In his 
Habilitationsschrift, Marcuse argues that Heidegger’s concept of historicity was based on 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of “life,” which Dilthey, in turn, had taken from Hegel’s early 
writings.28  Thus, in order to examine the ontological foundations of historicity, Marcuse 
undertakes a sweeping reinterpretation of Hegel’s work as a whole.  The unifying and 
guiding thread of Marcuse’s interpretation of Hegel was the distinction between 
epistemological and ontological notions of subjectivity, as suggested by Heidegger. 
Marcuse tries to demonstrate, in particular, how the concept of “life” in Hegel’s early 
writings expressed the fundamentally critical and active “ontological” tendency in his 
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thought, but that this tendency was increasingly marginalized and finally eliminated 
altogether by the “epistemological” tendency in Hegel’s later work, which stressed the 
ultimate primacy of absolute knowledge.   
 Although still couched in Heideggerian terminology, Marcuse’s study was clearly 
an attempt to uncover the origins of the Marxian dialectic in Hegel’s philosophy.  
Marcuse’s explorations of the philosophical origins of Marx’s theory in Hegel’s thought 
had begun to push him away from Heidegger. The publication of  Marx’s Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts in 1932 was further evidence for Marcuse that the philosophical 
resources needed to overcome the positivist depredations of Marx’s theory could be 
found in Marx’s own early work.  By the end of 1932 the need to supplement Marxism 
with Heideggerian phenomenology no longer seemed as urgent to Marcuse.29   
 Even though Marcuse began to move away from Heidegger in the early 1930s, he 
did not fully break with him until 1933, when Heidegger became an outspoken supporter 
of the National Socialists.  As we have seen, not only Heidegger’s phenomenology, but 
also Dilthey’s vitalism remained a strong presence in Marcuse’s thought in the early 
1930s.  Further evidence of Marcuse’s continued fascination with phenomenology and 
vitalism – but also of the potential dangers of this fascination – can be found in an article 
that Marcuse wrote in 1931 about the German sociologist Hans Freyer.  Although 
Marcuse’s engagement with Freyer was not as profound as his engagement with 
Heidegger, it is instructive insofar as Freyer’s theoretical position during the Weimar 
period was quite similar to Marcuse’s.  The fact that Marcuse praised Freyer as late as 
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1931, shortly before Freyer published an open defense of a “revolution from the right,”30 
highlights the precarious position into which his reception of phenomenology and 
vitalism had led him.   
 Before and during WWI, Freyer had been heavily involved in the German youth 
movement. His first publication, Antäus, was an collection of expressionist prose poems 
and aphorisms that was written during Freyer’s combat duty in the trenches on the 
Western front.  It was warmly received, not just among the youth movement, but also by 
leading intellectuals of the period on both the left and the right.  In the 1920s, Freyer 
developed a theoretical position that was – like Marcuse’s – heavily influenced by 
Dilthey and by his vitalist interpretation of Hegel, in particular.  Also like Marcuse, 
Freyer was very much interested in Marx. In the late 1920s, Freyer defined sociology as 
the self-reflexive “science of the class society of high capitalism.”31  At a time when its 
leading thinkers were trying to depoliticize sociology in order to establish it as a 
legitimate scientific discipline, Freyer railed against value-neutrality and insisted that 
sociology was political by its very nature.  Freyer’s arguments carried some weight, 
particularly after 1925 when he became the first person in Germany appointed to a 
professorship solely for sociology, at the University of Leipzig.  Freyer’s work was 
praised in the 1920s by other luminaries in the field, such as Georg Simmel, Karl 
Mannheim and even the young American, Talcott Parsons.  Freyer went on to form the 
“Leipzig School” of sociology, whose members included his students Arnold Gehlen and 
Helmut Schelsky.  But Freyer was also one of the most prominent Weimar intellectuals in 
the so-called conservative revolutionary camp.  Although he became disillusioned with 
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the Nazis fairly quickly, between the years 1931-5, he actively supported a “revolution 
from the right” in Germany and he believed that the National Socialist “movement” could 
perhaps bring about this transformation.32   
 The article Marcuse wrote on Freyer in 1931 was a review essay of a study Freyer 
had published the year before called Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft (Sociology 
as a Science of Reality).  The title of Freyer’s study highlights his critique of overly 
rationalistic approaches to the study of society, which he called Logoswissenschaften.  
With this term Freyer criticized not only the mainstream German sociology of a Weber or 
Tönnies, but also Dilthey.  Despite his praiseworthy efforts to recover Hegel’s philosophy 
and to separate the human sciences from the natural sciences, Freyer believed that 
Dilthey’s method remained too beholden to the rational core of Hegel’s philosophy, i.e. 
to Geist and its logocentric ideal of absolute knowledge.  According to Freyer, it was not 
enough for sociology to be a Logoswissenschaft, it must become a 
Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, which recognizes and studies the non-rational sources of 
social and cultural institutions and dominant forms of knowledge.  Everything that Hegel 
considered “objective spirit” had its origins in the non-rational processes of human “life” 
and voluntary acts of subjective will. By recovering the non-rational and subjective 
foundations of society, sociology as a science of reality would also become more 
conscious of its own role in changing society.  Freyer argued that all previous attempts to 
found a science of society, including Dilthey, have had a passive epistemological 
relationship to their object.  Freyer takes recourse to phenomenology in order to lay the 
foundations for a more active approach which insists that the study of society is also 
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necessarily linked to its transformation.  According to Freyer, in other words, sociology 
should not just interpret the world, but should also play an active, even revolutionary role 
in changing it. 
 The deceptive proximity of Freyer’s understanding of sociology to Marx’s 
emphasis on the unity of theory and praxis helps explain Marcuse’s interest in Freyer.  
Marcuse praised Freyer’s Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft “as the most profound 
attempt at theoretical self-reflection in contemporary sociology; indeed, in comparison to 
the other theoretical and methodological discussions of sociology that exist, it is the only 
radical attempt at self-reflection that exists at all.”33  Marcuse praises Freyer, in 
particular, for recognizing that the foundations of sociology must be sought in 
philosophy, and for turning to phenomenology, Dilthey’s vitalist historicism, Hegel and 
Marx in order to recover these foundations.  In addition, Marcuse praises Freyer’s 
critique of mainstream sociology as a Logoswissenschaft as well as his recourse to the 
concepts of life and historicity in order to recover its active, political dimension.  Indeed, 
for Marcuse, Freyer does not go far enough in this direction.  Marcuse argues that 
Freyer’s attempts to establish sociology as a system and his unbroken belief in the 
existence of a timeless realm of the spirit are irreconcilable with his desire to reestablish 
sociology as a self-reflexive and thoroughly historical critique of modern bourgeois 
society.  In order to criticize these remnants of traditional scientific methodology and 
idealism that still existed in Freyer’s work, Marcuse takes recourse to a Heideggerian 
concept of historicity.  Marcuse argues that the full historicity of sociology can only be 
established by recovering the ontological characteristics of Dasein.  But Marcuse moves 
beyond Heidegger to Marx, when he argues that these ontological structures have been 
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suppressed, not by an obscure process of Seinsvergessenheit, which has its roots in the 
rationalistic biases of ancient Greek philosophy, but in the proliferation of the commodity 
form and the rise of abstract labor in modern capitalism.  Marcuse would attempt to 
explain this “theory of historicity” in detail in his Habilitationschrift on Hegel.  For now, 
it must suffice for us to note that Marcuse’s interest in Dilthey’s vitalist historicism and 
Heidegger’s phenomenology had brought him very close indeed to Hans Freyer’s project 
of establishing a philosophical foundation for sociology based on the phenomenological 
concept of historicity and the vitalist notion of life.   
 During the next two years, Freyer would publish an inflammatory political tract 
called “Revolution from the Right;” Heidegger would embrace National Socialism, and 
Marcuse would be forced to flee Germany.  While in exile in Geneva and later in New 
York, Marcuse wrote an essay for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, i.e. the house 
journal of Max Horkheimer’s Institute for Social Research, for which Marcuse was now 
working.  In this essay, which was called “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the 
Totalitarian View of the State,” Marcuse articulated for the first time a serious critique of 
those aspects of vitalism and phenomenology which had prepared the way ideologically 
for the Nazi seizure of power.  Marcuse’ critique focused, in particular, on two broad 
tendencies, which he labeled “irrationalistic naturalism” and “political existentialism.”  
Although Marcuse included Lebensphilosophie under the rubric of “irrationalistic 
naturalism,” he was, like Horkheimer, careful to distinguish the proponents of vitalism 
who had made genuine philosophical contributions from those who developed a 
popularized version which contributed to the spread of various irrational ideologies in 
Weimar Germany. Marcuse placed Dilthey and Nietzsche in the former camp, since their 
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work was of the first order philosophically and represented a legitimate critique of the 
limits of the late nineteenth-century liberal notion of rationality.  In the latter camp 
Marcuse placed a number of conservative, conservative revolutionary and openly Nazi 
philosophers and literary figures, including Oswald Spengler, Müller van den Brück, 
Ernst Jünger, Ludwig Klages, Ernst Krieck and Alfred Bäumler. 
 Marcuse identified several broad tendencies that unified these purveyors of 
“irrationalistic naturalism.”34  First, all of them subordinated reason to irrational and 
putatively “natural” givens, which were accorded the power of ineluctable and irrefutable 
norms.  In the crudest manifestations of this ideological worldview, irrationalist and 
allegedly natural sources of life, such as “race” and “blood and soil” acquired the status 
of such unquestionable norms.  The second primary characteristic of “irrationalist 
naturalism,” according to Marcuse, is a “depravation of history” and a reduction of 
history to affirmative myth.  Marcuse even extends his critique of the denigration of 
history to Heidegger’s concept of historicity, which had been so important for his own 
writings prior to 1933.  In a clear reference to Heidegger’s alarming political 
development, Marcuse writes, “the strong emphasis on the historicity of existence reveals 
itself as empty […] Genuine historicity presupposes a cognitive relation of existence to 
the forces of history and, derived from it, the theoretical and practical critique of these 
forces.  But in existential anthropology the corresponding relation is limited to one of 
accepting a ‘mandate’ issued to existence by the ‘folk’.”35    
 Marcuse’s reference to “existential anthropology” here, points to the second main 
category in his critique of phenomenology and vitalism, namely “political 
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existentialism.” With this term Marcuse targets not only Heidegger, but also Carl 
Schmitt.  Marcuse refers to “political existentialism” in order to distinguish it from 
“philosophical existentialism.”  Even after 1933, Marcuse maintained his conviction that 
Heidegger had made important contributions to philosophy, but that the political 
realization of his ideals also revealed some serious shortcomings in his philosophy.  The 
same could be said for Schmitt.  Marcuse is less willing to separate Schmitt’s theory from 
his politics, but at one point in the essay he does acknowledge the “brilliance” of 
Schmitt’s critique of “liberal rationalism.”36  Once again, however, the partial realization 
of Schmitt’s political ideals of the total state left no doubt about the fundamental 
problems in his work.  Marcuse identifies several characteristics which define the 
“political existentialism” of Heidegger and Schmitt:  their voluntarism and decisionism, 
their theory of the total state, and their abstract negation of the rationalism and political 
ideals of the Enlightenment.  Marcuse describes the voluntarism and decisionism of 
political existentialism in terms of a “total activation, concretization and politicization of 
all dimensions of existence. […] The autonomy of thought and the objectivity and 
neutrality of science are repudiated as heresy or even as a political falsification on the 
part of liberalism.”37  Marcuse goes on to describe the “sorry picture that ‘existential’ 
anthropology paints of active man. He acts – but he knows not what for.  He acts – but he 
has not even decided for himself in favor of what he acts.  He simply “takes sides” or 
goes into action.  This anthropology derives its pathos from a radical devaluation of 
Logos as knowledge that reveals and decides.”   
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 Marcuse then demonstrates how the voluntarism and decisionism of political 
existentialism leads to a theory of the total state.  He writes,  
The existential as such is exempt from any rational standard or norm lying beyond it; it is itself the 
absolute norm and is inaccessible to any and all rational criticism and justification.  Accordingly, 
political conditions and relationships are now posited as the most emphatically significant factors 
‘deciding’ existence.  And within the political sphere all relationships are oriented in turn toward 
the most extreme ‘crisis’ […] The true possessor of political power is defined as beyond all 
legality and legitimacy: “Sovereign is he who decides on the state of emergency.”38   
Marcuse goes on to show how the non-conformist, “authentic” individual, with which 
philosophical existentialism had begun, is reduced to blind obedience to the “community 
of destiny” and the total state.  Summing up Heidegger’s development on this particular 
issue, Marcuse writes,  
In philosophy, existentialism begins as the antagonist in a great debate with Western rationalism 
and idealism, intending to save their conceptual content by injecting it into the historical 
concretion of individual existence.  It ends by radically denying its own origin; the struggle 
against reason drives it blindly into the arms of the powers that be.39
In short, what began as a justified critique of the limits of liberal rationality, its inability 
fully to realize the political ideals of the Enlightenment, ended as an abstract negation of 
those ideals themselves.  Rather than attempting to preserve and build upon those ideals 
to develop a rational critique of liberalism, as Hegel and Marx had both done, political 
existentialism falls behind the critical ideals of the Enlightenment into an irrational 
affirmation of the status quo.  
 Thus, in the end, Marcuse developed a critique of phenomenology and vitalism 
which was quite similar to that of Horkheimer.  Like Horkheimer, Marcuse recognized 
the truth content of its original critique of positivism and liberal rationalism at the end of 
the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.  But the popularization and politicization of 
phenomenology and vitalism, which reached its peak in the Weimar period, eventually 
transformed this critical truth into an apologetic and irrational defense of an authoritarian 
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regime.  Against these developments, both Horkheimer and Marcuse attempted to recover 
the critical content of Enlightenment rationalism and materialism.  This reevaluation of 
rationalism and materialism continued to play a strong role in Marcuse’s thought through 
the 1940s.  It culminated in his pathbreaking study of Hegel’s critical and dialectical 
rationalism, Reason and Revolution.40  Whereas Marcuse had placed the concept of “life” 
at the center of Habilitationschrift on Hegel, written in 1932 for Heidegger, in Reason 
and Revolution, Marcuse interpreted Hegel’s philosophy as attempt to preserve and 
rework the critical rationalism of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.   
 We have seen how Horkheimer began vigorously defending the Enlightenment in 
general, and the critical political thrust of the French Enlightenment in particular, already 
in the 1920s. But it is interesting to note that  Horkheimer’s interpretation of the 
Enlightenment began to shift in the mid-1930s.  After he had emigrated to the U.S. and 
began to see how dominant the positivist tradition still was in the U.S., Horkheimer 
believed a critique of the limitations of positivism was still important.  This tendency was 
reinforced by Horkheimer’s increasing proximity to Adorno, who finally joined the 
Institute as a full time member in 1938.  Horkheimer’s collaboration with Adorno’s in the 
next few years would, of course, result in the publication of Dialectic of Enlightenment in 
1944.  The predominantly pessimistic view of the Enlightenment and the sciences put 
forth in that book has obscured the much more positive assessment of the Enlightenment 
and the sciences which Horkheimer articulated in his early work, largely in response to 
popularized versions of phenomenology and vitalism.  I think it is important to recover 
the defense of the tradition of critical Enlightenment rationalism and materialism, which 
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one finds in the early thought of Horkheimer – and Marcuse as well – in order to 
distinguish them more clearly from recent post-structuralist critiques of reason and to 
counter the claims of Jürgen Habermas and others that the early Critical Theorists 
defended a totalizing critique of modernity.        
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